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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
In 2009 the European Union introduced the Lisbon Treaty. One of the changes this brought 
about was the introduction of a permanent president of the European Council. With this 
transformation the former EU presidency no longer exists and this thesis investigates the 
implications of this change. This is done by specifically looking at the national interests 
discussed in the European Council. Before the Lisbon Treaty Member States were able to 
influence the European Council by pushing their national interests, but based on the new 
institutional settings of the permanent presidency, this seemed after Lisbon more unlikely. An 
analysis of nine rotating presidencies of the Council of the European Union after Lisbon has 
been made and compared to the respective European Council conclusions of that period. The 
results show that in fact national interests have been discussed in the European Council. 
Nevertheless, only a third of all national interests has been discussed. On the other hand, the 
analyses also reveal that on average the discussed national interests in the European Council 
have significant similarity with the national interests of the Member States. Furthermore, the 
analysis brought also forward that certain national interests that seem not significant for the 
European Council have been discussed in the European Council, which could indicate that 
Member States can still push their national interests. In conclusion, national interests were 
discussed only to a low extent in the European Council, answering the research question of this 
thesis: to what extent are national interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the 
European Union discussed during European Council meetings? 
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“Self-interest is not myopic selfishness. It is whatever it is that 
interests the participants, whatever they value, whatever goals they 
pursue. The scientist seeking to advance the frontiers of his 
discipline, the missionary seeking to convert infidels to the true 
faith, the philanthropist seeking to bring comfort to the needy - all 
are pursuing their interests, as they see them, as they judge them by 
their own values.”       
 
-  Milton Friedman  -
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The European Union (EU) introduced, with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a new system of 
presidencies for the Council of the European Union (hereafter: Council of Ministers) and the 
European Council. Before 2009, the two institutions were both chaired by the EU Presidency, 
having another Member State as chair every six months. Since 2009 the EU Presidency no 
longer exists: the Council of Ministers is chaired by the rotating presidency, whilst the 
European Council has a permanent president. Nevertheless, the three terms (EU Presidency, 
rotating presidency and permanent presidency) are still used interchangeably by many 
scholars. This thesis will deal with the two new presidency systems and therefore it is 
important to stress that the rotating presidency concerns the Council of Ministers and has a 
rotation scheme of changing Member States as chair every six months, while the European 
Council has a permanent president for two and a half years, renewable once. 
 
Comparing the new systems with the former EU Presidency it becomes clear that various things 
have changed. The new rotating presidency is very similar to the EU Presidency, while the 
permanent presidency is of a completely new order. Next to the institutional changes, the 
practical implications for stakeholders have also changed. This thesis focuses on the 
implications for Member States that hold the rotating presidency and their influence in the 
European Council. A logical assumption would be that this influence has decreased, since these 
Member States no longer chair the European Council, but one should ask if this is really the 
case. To be more concrete, this thesis looks at such influences from the angle of national 
interests. The rationale behind this angle is simple: literature and studies suggest that Member 
States that held the EU Presidency in the pre-Lisbon era were able to influence the Council of 
Ministers and European Council to the extent of promoting their national interests. Although it 
can be argued that the EU Presidency and the rotating presidency are quite similar and thus 
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assuming that such influences still exist post-Lisbon, this school of thought cannot be applied to 
the European Council. The fundamental differences between the EU Presidency and 
permanent presidency are too extensive for such an assumption.  
 
Therefore, the main argument of this thesis is that national interests are not represented in the 
European Council post-Lisbon. This argument is derived from the reasoning that the differences 
with the EU Presidency have become to fundamental, as well as from the theory of normative 
institutionalism. This theory works on the notion that it is no longer the tolerated role of the 
rotating presidencies to influence the European Council. The research and analyses in this 
thesis shall indicate whether this argument can be maintained. 
 
The following chapter introduces the role of the presidency systems with a specific focus on 
national interests. The third chapter introduces the methodological approach, followed by two 
empirical chapters. Finally, this thesis is concluded in the sixth chapter.   
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2 
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE PRESIDENCY SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
The previous chapter introduced the changes regarding presidency systems in the EU with the 
introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon. The first section of this chapter will be addressed to the 
analysis of how the former EU Presidency system could be utilised by Member States that held 
the presidency for national interests, by reviewing relevant literature. The previous chapter 
also introduced the argument that Member States do not push their national interests in the 
European Council under the new permanent presidency system, and therefore the second 
section of this chapter will further investigate the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon 
regarding the European Council and the newly appointed office of permanent president.  
 
EU PRESIDENCY AS A SOURCE OF POWER 
 
Although the EU Presidency has been in place for decades, there are not many studies of it 
which draw on general theories of European integration or political and social sciences. In fact, 
a lot of the literature is of a descriptive nature and focuses on the role of the EU Presidency as 
part of an institutional structure (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw, 2002; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997; 
Svensson, 2000; Wallace, 1985). Although there are a few theory-driven studies (e.g. Tallberg, 
2008; Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006), most studies focus on analysing individual presidencies 
and are mainly provided by practitioners that work closely with institutes such as the Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) and think-thanks such as the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS). Although those studies are not theory-driven they do provide a useful 
insight of the EU Presidency period regarding the role of the chairing Member States and their 
capabilities to push domestic interests. 
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That presidency holding Member States push their national interests during meetings fits into 
the argumentation of Odell (2005) that chairing an international organisation gives the chair 
the power to control and shape negotiations and ultimately influences the outcome. Empirical 
evidence of Member States holding the presidency pushing their national interests is provided 
by various studies: Denmark, Finland and Sweden utilised their presidencies to emphasize 
development and promotion of the Northern Dimension which was obviously predominantly in 
the interest of the Nordic countries (Arter, 2000). Whereas Spain used its presidency to 
emphasize immigration issues due to growing xenophobia in its domestic political spectrum 
(Morata & Fernández, 2003). The United Kingdom (UK) was likewise effective in favouring 
domestic issues on the agenda during its EU Presidencies (Garel-Jones, 1992; Henderson, 1998) 
as was the Irish presidency (Rees, 2005).  
 
Member States holding the presidency utilising their chairing as the opportunity to push 
national interests is not just a conclusion made by various scholars, but also widely recognised 
by the Member States. In a study conducted by Tallberg (2006) on leadership in the EU, 
Member States acknowledged that having the EU Presidency is a significant tool of influence, 
which is in accordance with the argumentation of Odell (2005) of chairing an international 
organisation. A later study by Tallberg (2008) among significant political players, such as various 
prime ministers, revealed that Member States, especially the small- to medium sized ones, see 
the EU presidency as their most important source of power to influence decision-making. The 
evidence that Member States have used the EU Presidency to their own advantage and the fact 
that they were very aware of this opportunity means that the EU Presidency was one of the 
main tools for Member States to influence decision-making in the EU.  
 
Nevertheless its significance for the chairing Member States, the EU Presidency does no longer 
exist since 1 December 2009. As already touched upon in the introduction, there has been a 
seperation. The Council of Ministers now has the rotating presidency, which has a strong 
resemblance with the former EU Presidency, as Member States still have their six-month turn. 
As the differences with the permanent presidency are more fundamental, the following section 
will discuss this in more depth.  
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PERMANENT PRESIDENCY IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
 
The European Council was founded in the 1970s and although scholars recognise the central 
role it plays in European affairs (Piris, 2010; Puetter, 2013), the European Council has, 
compared to other institutions, received little academic attention. The main body of literature 
is of a descriptive nature and explains the position of the European Council within the 
institutional framework (e.g. Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; De Schoutheete, 2012a; Werts, 2008), 
the role of the European Council in specific policy fields (e.g. Devuyst, 2012) or are think-tank 
papers (e.g. De Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002). The relative small amount of scholarly work on 
decision-making in the European Council can be explained by the secretive nature of the 
European Council meetings. Article 4(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council 
states that “meetings of the European Council shall not be public”, which means that the only 
information is provided by the published conclusions of the meetings, which do not give any 
information about voting behaviour or what the various parties have said. Jacques Delors, 
former president of the European Commission stated that “it is almost as if, at the dizzy heights 
where these summits take place, the lack of oxygen discourages enthusiasm for investigation” 
(De Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002, foreword). The secrecy of the meetings and the fact that the 
Lisbon Treaty is relatively recent means that there is not much academic literature available 
about the European Council since Lisbon. Nevertheless, there are some policy papers, which do 
not have an academic background but are helpful to outline situation  (De Schoutheete, 2015; 
Versini, 2014), and academic articles (e.g. Dinan, 2017) that reflect on the personal 
achievements of the permanent president. For the purpose of this thesis this data is 
particularly interesting because it gives an insight on agenda setting and chairing in the 
European Council. 
 
“He is not the President of Europe!” is what van Schoutheete (2012b, p.16) explicitly stated 
about Herman van Rompuy – the first president of the European Council - in a policy paper on 
the EU’s institutional framework. First of all, he is right, there is no such thing as a European 
president. Nevertheless, the creation of a permanent president fits into the call to establish the 
position of a European president, which has been surfacing at discussions ever since the 1970s 
(Sap, 2005). The underlying thought of this discussion could perhaps be best explained by the 
famous quote by former US secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “who do I call if I want to call 
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Europe?” (Der Spiegel, 2008), referring to the lack of EU leadership and the diversity of officials 
who are responsible for their respective policy fields. With a permanent president in the 
European Council, and thus the EU having a distinct representative at the top of what is often 
portrayed as its main political institution (e.g. Dinan, 2010; Piris, 2010; Renshaw & Wallace, 
2006), the EU may have solved the question of Henry Kissinger and did perhaps de facto create 
the closest thing to a European president.   
 
The creation of a permanent president under the Lisbon Treaty is regarded by some as the 
most important innovation of the Treaty (Goebel, 2010) and finds its foundation in article 15(5) 
TEU: “The European Council shall elect its President, (….), for a term of two and a half years, 
renewable once”. Article 15(6) sets out the four core duties for the president and is therefore 
worth quoting in whole: 
 
1. “Shall chair it and drive forward its work; 
2. Shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in 
cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the 
General Affairs Council; 
3. Shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; 
4. Shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the 
European Council.” 
 
Article 15(6) TEU furthermore states that the president ensures the external representation of 
the Union on issues concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and that the 
president should not hold a national office. This latter requirement meant that the first 
permanent president Herman van Rompuy had to resign from his Belgian office, as did his 
Polish successor Donald Tusk.  Although this thesis will not draw on personal achievements 
from the presidents in the European Council, it is significant to personalize the presidency to a 
certain extent because van Rompuy had the opportunity to shape the new office. 
 
For instance, one of his first calls was to organize an informal European Council meeting 
establishing his authority as president. All the Member States accepted his call and came to 
Brussels, witnessing the president leading the negotiations (De Schoutheete, 2012b). Van 
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Rompuy quickly established more authority by creating working groups, presiding euro 
meetings and presenting reports (De Schoutheete, 2015). That the president has authority 
might sound rather obvious, but it was really through the efforts of van Rompuy that authority 
was created; prior to the Lisbon Treaty entering into force various academics had questioned 
the authority of the permanent president (e.g. Piris, 2010). For the rest of his term this meant 
that van Rompuy was in charge of the agenda, negotiations, supervision and implementation 
(De Schoutheete, 2015). Another characteristic van Rompuy was appraised for was his 
appearance (Versini, 2014). He managed to be a president with authority, but without 
overshadowing the members of the European Council, and gained respect by his extensive 
knowledge of the topics. Also, the president became a builder of trust, re-assuring the Member 
States that they would all be represented equally (Dinan, 2017). In conclusion, van Rompuy was 
able to  apply the assigned duties in the Lisbon Treaty into a presidency with authority, in 
charge of the agenda and representing all Member States. 
 
Alongside the basis in the treaty for the functioning of the permanent president, the General 
Secretariat of the Council  (2009) has published the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Council. This document goes more into depth as to how the European Council should function 
after the Lisbon Treaty, as well as mentioning other duties for the permanent president. Article 
2 (3) states that “the President shall establish close cooperation and coordination with the 
Presidency of the Council (…), particularly by means of regular meetings”, which means that 
even though there are two different presidency systems, there is close coordination between 
both offices. 
 
The following chapter introduces the methodological approach of this thesis. Drawing on the 
investigation of literature in this current chapter and connecting this with the theory of 
normative institutionalism in the next chapter, the hypothesis and research questions as well as 
the research methods are presented in the following chapter.  
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3 
 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
The previous chapter reviewed the academic literature and studies on the EU Presidency as 
well as the profound changes to the presidency since the Lisbon Treaty. The concept of 
national interests has also been briefly introduced in the context of the former EU presidency. 
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for this research by discussing the concept of 
national interests in international relations and the EU, as this concept plays an integral role 
throughout this research. Furthermore, the concept of normative institutionalism will be 
discussed and applied to the permanent presidency of the European Council. Subsequently, the 
two concepts lead to the research question and hypothesis of this thesis, followed by the 
methodological approach and research methods. 
 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
The concept of national interests in international relations, which explains actions of the 
nation-state in foreign policy (Weldes, 1996), is particularly important in the school of thought 
of realism (Morgenthau, 1978). The main characteristics of realism include: the nation-state is 
the highest entity; nation-states are the only actors in international relations; nation-states are 
individualistic and always pursue their self-interests (Donnely, 2008). National interest within 
realism has an ontological character and the state acts in a way to maximise its national 
interests by all means (Waltz, 1979). Realism is however a rather traditional way of theorising 
behaviour of the nation-state, which finds its origins from far before the development of 
European integration. In modern Europe, particularly since the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the school of thought of realism is harder to maintain. 
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Realism, often perceived as a conventional way of thinking in Europe, is challenged by many 
scholars, such as Sandholz (1993, p245):  
 
“National interests are defined in the context of the EC. Membership in the EC has 
become part of the interest calculation for governments and societal groups (…) the national 
interests of EC states do not have independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum and 
then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined and redefined in an international and 
institutional context that includes the EC. States define their interests in a different way as 
member of the EC than they would without it.” 
 
Nation-states defining their interests in a different manner because they are part of the EU, as 
Sandholz (1993) claims, would suggest that the state formulates its interests based on its place 
in a social construction. A supporting school of thought to this suggestion is constructivism, 
which is based on the idea that international relations are socially constructed (Adler, 1997). 
According to the school of thought of constructivism international relations are based on ideas 
rather than material forces  and the identities and interests of states are thus constructed by 
shared ideas (Wendt, 1999). National interests are therefore constructed through social 
interaction (Finnemore, 1996). The social construction of national interests, opposed to the 
conventional realist school of thought, could best be summarised as interest calculation. 
 
The social interaction between Member States of the EU could for example be seen in 
institutions such as the Council of Ministers and European Council where, opposed to the more 
supranational institutions, Member States are in the driving-seat. However, this means that 
Member States pursuing their national interests have to take into account the ideas of the 
other Member States. In terms of interest calculation, Member States have to carefully 
consider what interests to pursue, or as Lewis (2009) puts it: the very first lesson of newcomers 
in the EU is that they cannot be demanding all the time and expect others to listen. This would 
mean that a Member State cannot pursue all its interests and expect to be successful, but 
should rather calculate what interests are more likely to be achieved. Interest calculation might 
thus lead, in the eyes of conventional scholars, to odd results at first glance. To illustrate the 
definition of such odd results, an example in this regard: 
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Member State X, assuming the rotating presidency next year, is located in the Eastern part of 
the EU and has therefore significant stakes in energy policy. Nevertheless when drafting the 
programme for the presidency, Member State X chooses to pursue mainly maritime policy and 
youth employment, and leaves energy to its status quo. At first this might seem rather odd, but 
interest calculation made clear that the opinions in the EU on energy are so divided, it would 
not be possible for Member State X to achieve a tangible result. However, pursuing maritime 
policy and youth unemployment is likely to be subject to consensus, so the presidency will be 
way more successful in means of achieved result.  
 
The constructivist approach of interest calculation has according to Lewis (2009, p119) “a more 
expansive conception of interests (…) based on collective, social rationalities and expectations 
for norm-adhering behaviour1”. A Member State thus constructs perhaps its interests in first 
instance on factors such as the domestic political situation, geography (Schengen, border 
country, island nation etc.), welfare, Eurozone, but needs to calculate its interests also on its 
position in the social construction. As Weldes (1996) states, a Member State has to take the 
whole playing-field into account and act accordingly. 
 
Thus, understanding the situation and responding accordingly might lead to a national interest 
that is not only in the interest of one Member State, but also in the interest of multiple 
Member States or the EU: “it is (…) important to clarify that there is never a complete 
separation between the domestic and the international when dealing with national interests” 
(Buchan, 2012, p5). 
 
Therefore, this thesis draws on national interests from a constructivist approach. When 
formulating national interests, Member States take into account various factors as well as the 
other actors, looking at what is important, what can be achieved and what is expected and 
then make a calculation. It can thus be argued that Member States do not focus on one single 
topic, but have a variety of national interests, as demonstrated in the example. Interest 
                                                     
 
 
1 This refers to the ‘logic of appropriateness’, which is discussed in the following section about normative institutionalism. 
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calculation is thus the leading tool in establishing national interests.  This ultimately means that 
issues that seem obviously in the interest of a Member State, may not be pursued and are in 
this context not national interests.  
 
The following section introduces the notion of normative institutionalism, the second concept 
on which this research is based. As with the constructivist approach to national interests, 
normative institutionalism approaches institutions as a social construction, its actors being led 
by adaptation to situations and circumstances. 
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NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
An institution is a set of structured rules and practices that prescribe the behaviour for specific 
actors in specific situations (March & Olsen, 1989; March & Olsen, 1995), usually defined as a 
social structure (Scott, 1995). Due to the interdisciplinary discourse on institutions, the rules 
and practices that construct an institution can vary (Goodin, 1996) as well as other factors such 
as the nature of an institution, the effects of human behaviour and processes (March & Olsen, 
2011a). Nevertheless, in the EU we can identify seven official institutions as listed in Article 13 
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU): Council of Ministers, Court of Auditors, Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission, European 
Council and the European Parliament (EP). The study of institutions is referred to as 
institutionalism or institutional theory. 
 
Institutionalism as a theory has been subject to research in political- and social science since 
the late nineteenth century (Bell, 2002) and has developed from the old institutionalism school, 
where institutions were explained as formal structures (Kraft & Furlong, 2013), into the school 
of new institutionalism which also puts emphasis on institutions as an informal structure 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The school of new institutionalism originated in the 1980s as there 
was a renewed interest of political analysis in various fields (Bell, 1997), institutions became 
larger and more important to society (March & Olsen, 1984) and because of the effect of 
institutions on governmental decisions (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). Within the school of new 
institutionalism there are various sub-fields which all approach institutions from a different 
theoretical perspective such as actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997), feminist 
institutionalism (Mackay et al, 2010) and constructivist institutionalism, although the three 
main streams are historical institutionalism (Thelen, 1999), rational-choice institutionalism 
(Shepsle, 2006) and normative institutionalism (March, 1994). This thesis will primarily draw on 
the notion of normative institutionalism, which will be described in the following paragraph.  
 
Normative institutionalism approaches institutions and its actors from a sociological 
perspective and focuses especially on the norms and rules shaping an institution (Lowndes, 
2010). The study of normative institutionalism in EU studies assumes that Member States are 
committed to the EU and want to act in accordance with the EU’s political engagements, even 
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though they are not necessarily agreeing with the paths chosen (Thomas, 2009). Actors in an 
institution shaping their behaviour according to the institutions’ norms is the logic of 
appropriateness (March, 1994), which entails that actors want to fulfil their obligations and 
expected behaviour as they are part of a social collectivity (March & Olsen, 2011b). Since 
Member States are indispensable in the process of creating institutions, they accept the 
created institutional norms and feel obligated to act accordingly, regardless of varying 
preferences to particular issues (Thomas, 2009). Thus, normative institutionalism means that 
actors’ behaviour is based on the situation actors operate in, the institutional setting and the 
behaviour of other actors, as well as the rules and norms that apply to the setting. 
 
Deploying normative institutionalism over the other fields in this thesis is because this theory is 
opposing the old school of institutionalism by interpreting institutions from a sociological 
perspective. Moreover, normative institutionalism also counters the rational school of thought 
that is seen in rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, as actors in 
normative institutionalism are more led by adapting to situations then by constraint of 
rationality. Furthermore, normative institutionalism as a theory has most resemblance with the 
constructivist approach of national interests, where norms are an important aspect, especially 
looking at the concept of interest calculation. As these two concepts, normative 
institutionalism and national interests, form the theoretical foundation of this thesis, it is 
important that they share characteristics. 
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 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
This research will apply the logic of normative institutionalism on the European Council after 
the Lisbon Treaty. To be more explicit, this research focuses on the national interests of 
rotating presidencies in the European Council meetings. The rationale behind this is that 1) 
with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty the rotating presidencies should no longer be able to 
present national interests in the European Council; and 2) according to the logic of normative 
institutionalism, Member States do not push national interests in the European Council. 
Therefore, this research answers the following research question and draws on the subsequent 
hypothesis: 
 
RQ: To what extent are national interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the 
European Union discussed during European Council meetings? 
 
H: Due to the change of presidency systems and the logic of normative institutionalism, national 
interests of the rotating presidencies are not to any extent represented in the European Council. 
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 
PAGE 15 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The study of national interests in the EU is as Lewis (2009, p117) calls it “a field of 
methodological pluralism”. On the one hand there are studies that deploy quantitative 
analyses, while others choose to use qualitative analyses. In this thesis a mixed methods 
approach is chosen: on the one hand, qualitative analyses are deployed in order to extract 
national interests. On the other hand, to measure the extent to which national interests are 
discussed in European Council meetings, a quantitative analyses is carried out. In order to 
answer the research question this thesis is divided in two empirical chapters, both guided by a 
sub-question and the methodological approach, explained under the following subheadings. 
 
FIRST EMPIRICAL CHAPTER: NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
The goal of the first empirical chapter (chapter 4) is to establish national interests. There is a 
wide variety of literature that has handled national interests in the light of the EU (e.g. Miklin, 
2009; Moravcsik, 1991) and is focused mainly on the domestic political situation or the 
Member States’ ideological preference, researching for example manifests or speeches. In this 
thesis the national interests will be derived from the Presidency Programme Plans (PPP) of the 
Member States that hold the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers. To extract 
national interests from the PPPs fits with the concept of interest calculation: presidencies have 
to construct their interests they want to pursue in the Council of Ministers, which makes the 
national interests in the PPPs therefore arguably coming from a constructivist approach. 
 
The sample of Member States has to fulfil the following requirements: 1) Rotating presidency 
after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009; 2) Rotating presidency period 
is completed, in this research the latest date is set at December 2016; and 3) A representative 
sample of rotating presidencies in the period December 2009 – December 2016, in this 
research set at a minimum of 25%. The sample for this research consists of nine Member 
States that held the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers from 2010 until 2014. This is 
64% of the rotating presidencies between December 2009 – December 2016. The selected 
Member States are the following: Spain (2010), Belgium (2010), Hungary (2011), Poland (2011), 
Denmark (2012), Cyprus (2012), Ireland (2013), Lithuania (2013) and Greece (2014). Choosing 
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the sample of nine Member States is also done under the consideration that there is limited 
space in this thesis, but foremost because the nine presidencies are part of three Trio 
Presidencies.  
 
Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating presidencies work in trios to 
ensure continuity. The three Member States create an 18-Month Trio Presidency Program 
(18MTPP), also known as common work programmes (The Belgian Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union, 2010). The first step in deriving national interests is to compare the 
18MTPPs with the PPPs of the respective trio Member States. The goal of this analysis is 
foremost to see whether Member States already differentiate in their individual PPPs from the 
18MTPP, even though they agreed on priorities with the other Member States. The main 
exercise in this regard is a comparison of the stated overall priorities. 
 
Subsequently, a deeper analysis of the PPPs will be carried out by a preliminary discourse 
analysis. Because the PPPs have different authors and contain a diverse variety of specific 
words, the analysis is done by post define coding, which means that codes are established after 
the analysis. In specific, the analysis focuses on the linkage between words and actors. The 
actors in this regard are the rotating presidency and the EU. The analysis will contemplate what 
words are used for the presidency as an actor in the codebook. The goal of this analysis is to 
separate the two streams in the PPPs, one being presidency objectives and the other EU-wide 
objectives. Distinguishing these two streams is important because only the presidency 
objectives are of significance for this research, because they contemplate the objectives of the 
presidency, including any display of national interests. Finally, the presidency objectives are 
analysed and the national interests, if any, are presented per Member State. It is however 
crucial to keep in mind that the presented national interests are formulated on the basis of 
interest calculation as explained in the first section of this chapter, meaning that some results 
may seem odd2, but are in this context considered to be national interests. 
 
                                                     
 
 
2 This refers to the example set in the first section of this chapter 
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This three phase-analysis (table 1) answers the first sub-question: to what extent do Member 
States display national interests in their Presidency Programme Plans? 
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Analysis Comparison of 18MTTPs and 
the respective PPPs 
Preliminary discourse analysis Analysis of the presidency objectives 
Goal To see whether there is any 
differentiation in the overall 
priorities 
Distinguishing between 
presidency objectives and EU-
wide objectives  
Derive national interests from PPPs 
Table 1 - Three phase-analysis of the first empirical chapter 
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SECOND EMPIRICAL CHAPTER: EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETINGS 
 
The goal of the second empirical chapter (chapter 5) is to examine whether, and to what 
extent, national interests are discussed in the European Council. The national interests as 
analysed in the first empirical chapter are compared to what is discussed in the European 
Council. More specifically, the conclusions of the European Council meetings are thoroughly 
analysed and compared with the national interests, relating to the same period (see table 2), 
comprising out of a data-set of 23 conclusions. 
 
Period Presidency European Council meetings 
2010 (Jan-Jun) Spain 2 
2010 (Jul-Dec) Belgium 3 
2011 (Jan-Jun) Hungary 4 
2011 (Jul-Dec) Poland 2 
2012 (Jan-Jun) Denmark 2 
2012 (Jul-Dec) Cyprus 2 
2013 (Jan-Jun) Ireland 4 
2013 (Jul-Dec) Lithuania 2 
2014 (Jan-Jun) Greece 2 
Table 2 - European Council meetings per rotating presidency period 
 
The conclusions that will be analysed are from the formal and extraordinary meetings in the 
European Council. The informal meetings cannot be analysed because there are no conclusions 
published (Vanden Broucke et al, 2015). The European Council conclusions are the only data 
provided about the meetings, as they are held under high secrecy. 
 
This comparative approach is a qualitative analysis, focusing on applying the analyses of 
chapter 4 to the European Council meetings. The results of the comparative analysis enable 
this research to continue in a quantitative manner. By comparing the amount of national 
interests discussed in the European Council with the total of national interests in the nine PPPs, 
numbers and percentages should provide a first glance in completing the goal of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, by merely taking into account the overall numbers, a comprehensive conclusion 
cannot be drawn. Therefore, a significant distinction will be made on the extent of how 
national interests from the PPPs are reflected in the European Council meetings. 
 
As pointed out in the first section of this chapter, national interests may have overlap with the 
interests of other Member States or the EU. In this chapter the focus is on the overlap between 
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the rotating presidency and the European Council conclusions as such, as it cannot be clearly 
defined what the positions of the other twenty-seven Member States are. Taking the possible 
overlaps into account, national interests cannot be considered to be in binary opposition, but a 
notion. Therefore, to measure to what extent national interests are represented in the 
European Council, the following measuring scale (table 3) has been developed: 
 
Category 1 - CO 2 - NCO 3 - SO 4 - MO 5 - NO 
Name Complete Overlap 
 
Nearly Complete Overlap Significant overlap 
 
Minimum overlap 
 
No overlap 
 
Explanation National interests 
of PPPs in this 
category have a 
complete overlap 
with a main topic of 
the European 
Council conclusion, 
meaning that the 
national interest 
was identical and 
the only issue 
discussed in that 
main topic 
National interests of PPPs 
in this category have a 
nearly complete overlap 
with a main topic of the 
European Council 
conclusion, meaning that 
the national interest was 
discussed throughout the 
whole main topic, but 
with some minor 
differentiations compared 
to the national interest 
National interests 
of PPPs in this 
category have a 
significant overlap 
with a main topic 
of the European 
Council 
conclusion, 
meaning that the 
national interest 
was a key-issue of 
a main topic, but 
not necessarily the 
only key-issue 
National interests 
of PPPs in this 
category have a 
minimum overlap 
with a main topic 
of the European 
Council 
conclusion, 
meaning that the 
national interest 
was mentioned, 
but together with 
various other 
issues. 
National interests 
of PPPs in this 
category have no 
overlap with a 
main topic of the 
European Council 
conclusion, 
meaning that the 
national interests 
was located under 
other issues and 
thus arguably of 
less significance 
for the European 
Council 
Table 3 - Measuring scale on the extent of overlap of national interests between PPPs and European Council 
Conclusions 
 
To understand the measuring scale to the full extent, it is crucial to understand the structure of 
European Council conclusions, especially the difference between main topics and other topics. 
A conclusion is structured as a document with various chapters, of which each chapter is a 
main topic. In this main topic there are usual various sub-headings which deal with issues that 
relate to the main topic. There can be one main topic in a conclusion, but also multiple main 
topics. On the other hand, there are the other issues which are not placed under the umbrella 
of a main topic. These other issues are usually rather short and seem to be of less significance. 
There can be one other issue, but also multiple. 
 
Finally, the results of the number of national interests represented in the European Council 
conclusions per category is weighed. This is done by assigning scores (1 for complete overlap  
 5 for no overlap) according to the categories, providing the opportunity to conclude on the 
average extent of representation.  
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 By comparing the national interests with the 23 European Council conclusions, the second sub-
question will be answered: To what extent do European Council meetings reflect the national 
interests of the Member State that holds the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers? 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter introduced the theory of normative institutionalism and how this research draws 
on this theory. Also, the methodological approach and its application are explained. Using the 
theory and the subsequent methodological approach should result in answering the research 
question of this thesis. Table 4 provides an overview of the research question, hypothesis and 
sub-questions. The following chapter is the first empirical chapter of this thesis, focusing on 
national interests in the PPPs. 
 
Category Overview 
Research question 
(Chapter 6) 
To what extent are national interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the 
European Union discussed during European Council meetings? 
 
Hypothesis Due to the change of presidency systems and the logic of normative institutionalism, 
national interests of the rotating presidencies are not to any extent represented in the 
European Council. 
 
Sub-question 1 
(Chapter 4) 
To what extent do Member States display national interests in their Presidency Programme 
Plans? 
 
Sub-question 2 
(Chapter 5) 
To what extent do European Council meetings reflect the national interests of the Member 
State that holds the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers? 
 
Table 4 - Overview of the hypothesis, research- and sub-questions 
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4 
 
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE PRESIDENCY 
PROGRAMME PLANS 
 
 
 
This is the first empirical chapter, which looks specifically at the national interests displayed in 
the PPPs. The first section of this chapter executes a comparative analysis between the PPPs 
and 18MTPPs, to see whether Member States differentiate from the trio presidencies. Once 
the individual overall priorities are established per Member State, the PPPs are further 
analysed in the second section of this chapter. The goal of the second section is to make a 
distinction between what is presented in the PPPs as an EU-wide objective, versus what is 
presented as a presidency objective during the respective presidency terms. This analysis is 
based on a discourse analysis approach by post define coding. The third section in this chapter 
investigates the presidency objectives derived from the second section analysis. These 
presidency objectives are further investigated, going beyond the overall priorities from section 
one, in order to establish whether the presiding Member State is giving preference to any 
topics in such a manner that they can be labelled as national interests. This chapter will answer 
the first sub-question: to what extent do Member States display national interests in their 
Presidency Programme Plans? and contributes to answering the research question of this 
thesis: to what extent are national interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the 
European Union discussed during European Council meetings? 
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OVERALL PRIORITIES IN THE PRESIDENCY PROGRAMMA PLANS 
 
The 18MTPP is the overall plan of the trio presidency during its 18-month term. The 18MTPP is 
presented to the Council of Ministers and consists of a strategic framework and operational 
programme. In the strategic framework the overall priorities of the trio presidency are 
presented as agreed upon by the three Member States. In this section the priorities of the 
three trio presidencies are presented in tables. Also, an analysis is carried out to compare the 
overall priorities of the 18MTPP with the overall priorities of the individual PPPs. 
 
The priorities of the 18MTPP of the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian trio presidency (Council of 
the European Union, 2009) are set out in table 5 and consist of a total of twelve overall 
priorities. These overall priorities are compared with the PPPs of Spain (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores y Cooperación & Secretaría de Estado para la Unión Europea, 2010), Belgium 
(Belgium, 2010) and Hungary (Hungary, 2011). As demonstrated in the columns of the 
individual PPPs, the presidencies have not adopted all 18MTPP overall priorities as overall 
priorities in their PPP. Spain and Belgium do for example not recognise agriculture and fisheries 
as an overall priority, while Hungary has among others not adopted the review of the Lisbon 
strategy as an overall priority. Nevertheless, the topics that are not overall priorities do appear 
in the PPPs when discussing the operational programme.  
 
The same conclusion can be drawn when the 18MTPPs of the Polish, Danish and Cypriot trio 
presidency (Council of the European Union, 2011) and the Irish, Lithuanian and Greek trio 
presidency (Council of the European Union, 2012) are analysed. Table 6 demonstrates the 
differences of the Polish- (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), Danish- (Denmark, 2012) and 
Cypriot PPP (Cyprus, 2012) with their respective 18MTPP, whereas table 7 demonstrates the 
differences of the Irish- (Ireland, 2013), Lithuanian- (Lithuania, 2013) and Greek PPP (Greece, 
2014) with their respective 18MTPP. It becomes evident that most PPPs adopt many overall 
priorities from the 18MTPPs, although some Member States are more selective such as, for 
example, Denmark and Greece. 
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18MTPP priorities of Spain, Belgium and Hungary  Spain PPP Belgium PPP Hungary PPP 
• Review of Lisbon Strategy X X  
• Modernising financial/economic system X X X 
• Social Agenda X X X 
• Energy and climate change X X X 
• Stockholm programme X X X 
• Management of natural resources X X X 
• Agriculture and fisheries   X 
• European policy immigration and asylum X   
• External EU representation X X X 
• Enlargement X X X 
• Budget review   X 
• Institutional implementation of the Lisbon Treaty X X  
Table 5 - 18MTPP priorities vs. PPP priorities Spain, Belgium, Hungary 
 
18MTPP priorities of Poland, Denmark and Cyprus Poland PPP Denmark PPP Cyprus PPP 
• Economic governance X X X 
• Europe 2020 strategy X X X 
• Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) X X X 
• Citizens   X 
• Societal challenges X  X 
• Sustainable growth and resource efficiency  X  
• Stockholm Programme  X X 
• Neighbourhood policy X  X 
• EU’ role in the world X  X 
• Security and immigration  X X 
Table 6 - 18MTPP priorities vs. PPP priorities Poland, Denmark, Cyprus 
 
18MTPP priorities of Ireland, Lithuania and Greece Ireland PPP Lithuania PPP Greece PPP 
• Strengthening of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)  X X 
• Progressing the Banking Union X X X 
• Concluding the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)  X  
• Compact for growth and jobs X X X 
• Competitiveness Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) X  X 
• Digital Single Market and Digital Agenda X X  
• Enlargement X X  
• Single Market X X  
• Development and humanitarian issues    
• Year of the citizens  X  
Table 7 - 18MTPP priorities vs. PPP priorities Ireland, Lithuania, Greece 
 
Now that it has been demonstrated that Member States differentiate in their PPPs from the 
trio presidencies’ 18MTPPs, the following section further analyses the intentions of the 
individual PPPs. This analysis goes beyond the overall priorities and looks as well at the strategic 
framework as the operational programme of the individual PPPs. 
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PRESIDENCY OBJECTIVES VERSUS EU-WIDE OBJECTIVES IN PRESIDENCY 
PROGRAMME PLANS 
 
In the PPP the Member State presents not only the objectives to be achieved by the 
presidency, but also implies what line the EU in general, or in specific, should follow. Therefore, 
this section makes the distinction between the streams of presidency objectives and EU-wide 
objectives in PPPs by a preliminary discourse analysis as outlined the third chapter.  The nine 
PPPs have been analysed by post define coding and the codes can be found in table 18. 
 
Differentiating between presidency objectives and EU-wide objectives 
is necessary because only the former category is of significance for this 
research. The number of times a code has been used in combination 
with a presidency objective is per PPP presented in table 8. Two things 
are important to keep in mind at this stage: first, the number of code 
hits does not necessarily mean that the PPP has more or less 
presidency objectives, as it is also depending on other factors such as 
use of language. Second, the term ‘objectives’ should be considered as 
broad overarching umbrella, meaning that it entails all the individual 
codes used in table 18. 
 
PPP  Code hits 
Spain 115 
Belgium 149 
Hungary 157 
Poland 221 
Denmark 225 
Cyprus 228 
Ireland 244 
Lithuania 275 
Greece 305 
Table 8 - Code hits per PPP 
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IDENTIFYING NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 
The discourse analysis in the previous section enables this research to investigate solely the 
presidency objectives. This section contemplates the further analysis of these presidency 
objectives to determine whether any of the presidencies have displayed specific national 
interests in their respective presidency objectives. The identified national interests have 
classifications (letter for country, number for identified national interest) to enable an easier 
referral to these national interests later in this research. The national interests are presented in 
the following tables (9-17). 
 
 National interests of Spain 
S1 Promoting R&D&I and technological development, intensifying the collaboration between the public and 
private research sectors 
S2 Biodiversity preservation initiatives 
S3 Equal distribution of seats in the EP 
S4 The first EU-Morocco Summit 
S5 Negotiations of the OECD Export Credit Group and the OECD Consensus Group 
S6 The EU 2020 Growth and Employment Strategy in the Economic and Financial Crisis 
S7 Victims of gender based violence 
S8 Forest fire prevention and extinction 
S9 Consolidation of European social protection systems in light of the Year for Combatting Poverty and 
Social Exclusion 
S10 The creation of a European Observatory on Gender-based Violence 
S11 Common Fisheries Policy 
S12 Regional cooperation on climate change and energy matters to reinforce the EU’s role as a global actor 
Table 9 - Spanish national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
 National interests of Belgium 
B1 The question of green- and white jobs 
B2 Free circulation of knowledge in the European Research Area (ERA) 
B3 The role of Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds as a long term instrument to achieve smart-, 
sustainable- and inclusive growth 
B4 Negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
B5 Combating violence against women 
B6 Development of Smart Grids aimed at promoting energy savings and decentralised renewable energy 
sources 
B7 Initiatives relating to improving legislation and rules regarding environmental issues 
B8 Problems associated with the failure to complete schooling and the role of education and training 
B9 Development of a European system for the taking of evidence as described in the Stockholm 
programme 
B10 Mediation in instances of parental kidnapping 
Table 10 - Belgian national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
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 National interests of Hungary 
H1 Roma integration and child poverty 
H2 The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area 
H3 The European Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 
H4 Flood management and risk assessment activities 
H5 The establishment of a single European railway area 
H6 Developing administrative cooperation between Member States concerning the transposition of 
internal market legislation 
H7 Implementation of the New Skills and Jobs- and the Youth on the Move flagship initiatives 
Table 11 - Hungarian national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
 National interests of Poland 
P1 Measures to eliminate barriers for cross-border online transactions 
P2 Negotiations on a EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in the scope of 
the EU-Ukraine association agreement 
P3 Good governance with regard to the taxation of saving incomes and agreements on counteracting fraud 
signed with third countries 
P4 Strengthen economic cooperation with countries in the Eastern dimension of the ENP 
P5 The development of e-commerce 
P6 The impact assessment instrument in light of the Smart Regulation 
P7 ‘Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era’ and ‘Resource efficient Europe’ 
P8 Visa facilitation- and liberalisation with Eastern partnership countries and the Russian Federation 
P9 Investments relating to the development of renewable energy in rural areas 
P10 Cooperation between young people from the EU and their peers from Eastern European (ENP) and 
Caucasus countries 
Table 12 - Polish national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
 National interests of Denmark 
D1 Trade liberalisation with the Eastern and Southern ENP countries 
D2 Simplification and flexibility in the public procurement directives 
D3 Transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
D4 Revision of the roaming regulation 
D5 The energy infrastructure in Europe under the energy efficiency directive 
D6 Prevention of terrorism, especially the causes of radicalisation 
D7 Gender segregated educational choices 
D8 The Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and benefit sharing 
D9 The Low Carbon Economy Roadmap 2050 
Table 13 - Danish national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
 National interests of Cyprus 
C1 Re-energising the Integrated Maritime Policy 
C2 Food security and improved nutrition in developing countries 
C3 Proposal for the Recovering and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms 
C4 Establishment of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
C5 Domestic violence issues and the role of law enforcement authorities 
C6 Streamlining and simplification of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
C7 Boosting entrepreneurship in the light of the strategy for competitiveness and growth 
C8 Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Online Dispute Resolution 
C9 Revision of the Trans-European Transport Networks as part of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
C10 Development of indicators for child well-being 
Table 14 - Cypriot national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
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Table 15 - Irish national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
Table 16 - Lithuanian national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
Table 17 - Greek national interests derived from the analysis of the presidency objectives 
 
 
 National interests of Ireland 
I1 Youth Employment and Social Investment packages in the areas of health, mobility and education 
I2 Negotiations on a comprehensive EU-US Trade and Investment Agreement 
I3 Maritime Spatial Planning 
I4 Maritime security and surveillance 
I5 The Directive on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the EU 
I6 Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy 
I7 The European Research Area 
I8 Negotiations of the European Social Fund (ESF), the Programme for Social Change and Innovation 
(PSCI) and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 
I9 Posting of workers under the Single Market Act 
I10 Connecting Europe Facility (ECF) 
I11 Youth employment under the EU 2020 strategy 
 National interests of Lithuania 
L1 Youth guarantee initiatives and encouragement of apprenticeships 
L2 Partnerships with the EU’s Eastern partners in the field of the CSDP 
L3 Strengthening relationships with the countries in the ENP’s Eastern Dimension to strengthen their 
political and economic association with the EU 
L4 Free Trade Area (FTA) with the countries in the ENP’s Eastern Dimension 
L5 Higher youth employment 
L6 Implementation of the Action Plan for the EU’s internal energy market 
L7 Management of expenditure in food chain, animal health and animal welfare, plant health and plant 
reproductive material 
 National interests of Greece 
G1 Maritime policies, highlighting security and growth, including energy 
G2 Maritime Spatial Planning 
G3 EMU: social indicators and scoreboard from the Joint Employment Report 
G4 Assisting the Middle East and Africa, especially the League of Arab States 
G5 Supporting the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo 
G6 Enhancing the EU military rapid response capabilities, including the EU Battlegroups 
G7 Enhancing the dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the Southern Dimension of the ENP 
G8 Maintaining the current distribution of funding in the ENP: any decrease in funding for the 
Mediterranean partners would be perceived as a change in EU policy towards the southern neighbours 
G9 Development and strengthening of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The goal of this chapter was to answer the first sub-question: to what extent do Member States 
display national interests in their Presidency Programme Plans? Three key conclusions that arise 
from the analyses above are stated in these concluding remarks. 
 
First of all, the analyses of the individual PPPs reveal that Member States do not adopt all the 
priorities as agreed upon under their Trio Presidency. Most Member States maintain a 
significant number of set priorities, while others take the liberty to only adopt a few priorities 
from the Trio Presidency into their individual PPP. Thus, although three Member States 
cooperate under the Trio Presidency, they still have and use their freedom to tailor their own 
Presidency Program Plans. 
 
Secondly, the analyses of the presidency objectives in the PPPs reveal that every single 
Member State is embedding national interests into its PPP. The analyses identified seven to 
twelve national interests per PPP.  
 
Thirdly, it becomes clear that various factors as stated in chapter 3, such as the geographical 
location of a Member State play a role in interest calculation, for example with Greece´s  
interest in the Southern Dimension of the ENP and Union for the Mediterranean, Lithuania’s 
interest in a FTA and partnerships with Eastern partners or Hungary’s interest in Bulgaria and 
Romania joining the Schengen area. Also factors that could arguably be subscribed to certain 
Member State clearly play a role, for example maritime issues for Cyprus, Greece and Ireland, 
Roma integration in Hungary or Ireland’s interest in the Common Fisheries Policy). 
Nevertheless, overall it is shown that the Member States have a wide topical variety of national 
interests, which is in line with interest calculation from a constructivist approach as there is no 
single focus on a single topic.  
 
To answer the sub-question, to what extent do Member States display national interests in their 
Presidency Programme Plans?, the three key conclusions show that the Member States use 
their Presidency Program Plans to put their national interests forward. Based on the outcome 
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of the analysis that every Member State does this, we can conclude that displaying national 
interests is happening to a significant extent under the rotating presidencies. 
 
The next chapter will analyse the selected European Council meetings and answer the second 
sub-question: to what extent do European Council meetings reflect the national interests of the 
Member State that holds the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers? 
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Presidency Post defined codes 
Spain Act, address, advance, advocate, aim, begin, boost, collaborate, continue, contribute, direct, effort, emphasise, encourage, endorse, ensure, expand, 
focus, foster, further, guarantee, initiate, intend, make, objective, play, prioritise, promote, pursue, reinforce, relevance, responsibility, start, 
strengthen, study, submit, support, wish, work 
Belgium Accompany, action, address, aim, assume, attempt, attention, begin, commence, commit, conduct, continue, contribute, coordinate, deal, devote, do, 
draft, emphasise, encourage, endeavour, ensure, examine, focus, follow up, give, guarantee, highlight, hope, improve, initiate, intend, invite, keen, key, 
launch, monitor, objective, organize, pay, prepare, present, prioritise, proceed, promote, propose, provide, pursue, reopen, review, seek, start, stress, 
strive, submit, subscribe, support, underline, want, wish, work 
Hungary Address, advance, aim, approximate, assist, assume, attach, attribute, believe, carry, commit, consider, continue, cooperate, deal, dedicate, devote, 
discuss, do, draw, emphasise, encourage, endeavour, engage, ensure, evaluate, explore, facilitate, focus, follow, foster, further, handle, help, 
implement, intend, invite, make, monitor, objective, organise, pay, plan, prioritise, produce, progress, promote, propose, pursue, ready, regard, rely, 
seek, start, strive, support, take, task, welcome, wish, work 
Poland Act, address, aim, attach, attempt, commence, concentrate, conduct, consider, continue, develop, devote, draw, emphasise, endeavour, engage, 
ensure, focus, foster, give, hold, hope, improve, increase, initiate, intend, involve, launch, look, make, organise, pay, plan, prioritise, promote, recognise, 
regard, see, start, strive, support, take, try, underline, undertake, venture, want, welcome, wish, work 
Denmark Achieve, assign, attach, carry, collaborate, commence, continue, contribute, create, devote, effort, emphasise, endeavour, engage, enhance, ensure, 
focus, follow up, forward, further, implement, improve, increase, intend, invite, launch, maintain, monitor, negotiate, prioritise, promote, put, renew, 
revise, seek, set, strengthen, strive, support, wish, work 
Cyprus Achieve, acknowledge, address, advance, aim, attach, carry, commit, conclude, continue, contribute, coordinate, deal, determine, devote, draw, 
emphasise, endeavour, engage, ensure, explore, facilitate, focus, follow, forward, goal, help, highlight, hold, initiate, intend, invite, launch, maintain, 
make, monitor, objective, organise, pay, prepare, press, prioritise, proceed, progress, promote, propose, provide, pursue, recognise, reflect, review, 
seek, stand, start, steer, strive, support, take, work 
Ireland Accelerate, achieve, act, advance, aim, assist, attach, await, build, carry, commence, commit, complete, consider, continue, contribute, coordinate, deal, 
develop, devote, discuss, drive, emphasise, enable, encourage, endeavour, enhance, ensure, expect, facilitate, focus, forward, hold, hope, host, intend, 
look, make, manage, mindful, objective, oversee, place, plan, play, prepare, prioritise, progress, promote, provide, pursue, push, realise, remove, 
represent, secure, seek, set, start, support, tackle, work 
Lithuania Adopt, aim, arrange, asses, call, consider, continue, contribute, cooperate, coordinate, dedicate, devote, discuss, emphasize, encourage, ensure, expect, 
focus, give, highlight, host, initiate, intend, involve, launch, lead, make, offer, organise, pay, place, plan, prepare, priority, proceed, promote, propose, 
rely, run, seek, start, strengthen, strive, submit, suggest, support, take, underline, urge, work 
Greece Advance, aim, aspire, assist, attach, attribute, believe, build, commit, concentrate, conclude, consider, continue, contribute, cooperate, coordinate, 
determine, devote, discuss, draw, endeavour, effort, elaborate, emphasise, encourage, endorse, engage, ensure, examine, expect, explore, focus, 
follow, forward, foster, further, give, handle, highlight, hold, host, initiate, intend, labour, lead, look, maintain, make, monitor, negotiate, offer, open, 
organise, place, play, prepare, prioritise, progress, promote, provide, pursue, recognise, responsible, seek, set, stand, start, strive, support, try, 
underline, undertake, welcome, will, wish, work 
Table 18 - Codebook of the post-defined codes in the individual PPPs 
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5 
 
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL  
 
 
 
The analysis of the previous chapter revealed that Member States display national interests in 
their PPPs, and that this is happening to a significant extent. This chapter will specifically look 
at these national interests in the context of European Council meetings. The first section 
discusses per presidency period the respective European Council meetings and compares the 
content of the conclusions with the derived national interests to see whether these national 
interests come back in the European Council meetings. The results of the analyses are 
displayed in a comprehensive overview in the form of a matrix to show in which European 
Council conclusions national interests were represented (table 20). This chapter will answer 
the second sub-question: to what extent do European Council meetings reflect the national 
interests of the Member State that holds the rotating presidency in the Council of Ministers? 
and contributes to answering the research question of this thesis: to what extent are national 
interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the European Union discussed during 
European Council meetings? 
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EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETINGS DURING THE PRESIDENCIES 
 
During the nine rotating presidencies twenty-three European Council meetings were held 
(table 2). Under the majority of rotating presidency periods there were two European Council 
meetings, with the exception of Belgium (three meetings) and Hungary and Ireland (four 
meetings). The analyses of the European Council conclusions are discussed per rotating 
presidency, in chronological order, in this section. When a similarity between a national 
interest and conclusion of the European Council has been found, it is analysed in the following 
manner: Classification of national interest - quote European Council conclusion (page number 
quote) - categorisation of overlap according to the measuring scale.  
 
THE SPANISH PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2010a) during the Spanish Presidency 
was held on 25/26 March 2010, discussing two main topics: 1) Europe 2020: a new strategy 
for jobs and growth; and 2) Climate change: refocusing after Copenhagen. The comparison 
with the national interests of Spain (table 9) reveals that three national interests were 
represented in the conclusion:  
 
- S2: “there is an urgent need to reverse continuing trends of biodiversity loss and 
ecosystem degradation” (p.9). Biodiversity preservation initiatives has a minimum 
overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on climate change; 
- S6: “we have faced the world’s worst economic crisis since the 1930s. (…) Restoring 
macroeconomic stability and returning public finances to a sustainable path are 
prerequisites for growth and jobs” (p.1). Jobs and growth have a nearly complete 
overlap (2-NCO) with the first main topic of this meeting; 
- S12: “addressing climate change at all regional and bilateral meetings, including at 
summit level, as well as other fora such as the G20” (p.8). Reinforcing the role of the 
EU as a global actor has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on 
climate change. 
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The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2010b) during the Spanish 
Presidency was held on 17 June 2010, discussing four main topics: 1) A new European 
strategy for jobs and growth; 2) G20 Toronto summit; 3) Millennium development goals; and 
4) Climate change. The comparison with the national interests of Spain (table 9) reveals that 
two national interests were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- S3: “confirming (…) the addition of 18 seats in the European Parliament until the end 
of the present 2009-2014 parliamentary term” (p.10). The addition of seats has no 
overlap (5-NO) with a main topic; 
- S6: “finalised the European Union’s new strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth” (p.2). Jobs and growth have a nearly complete overlap (2-NCO) with 
the conclusion of the first main topic of this meeting. 
 
THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2010c) during the Belgian Presidency 
was held on 16 September 2010, discussing two main topics: 1) Relations with strategic 
partners; and 2) Task force on economic governance. The comparison with the national 
interests of Belgium (table 10) reveals that no national interests were represented in the 
conclusion. The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2010d) during the 
Belgian Presidency was held on 28/29 October 2010, discussing four main topics: 1) Task 
force on economic governance; 2) Seoul G20 summit; 3) Cancún conference on climate 
change; and 4) Summits with third countries. The comparison with the national interests of 
Belgium (table 10) reveals that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- B7: “paving the way towards a global and comprehensive legally binding framework, 
integrating the political guidance given in the Copenhagen Accord” (p.4). The 
conclusion on legislation for environmental issues has a significant overlap (3-SO) with  
the conclusion on the Seoul G20 summit.  
 
The third European Council meeting (European Council, 2010e) during the Belgian Presidency 
was held on 16/17 December 2010, discussing one main topic: 1) Economic policy. The 
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comparison with the national interests of Belgium (table 10) reveals that no national interests 
were represented in the conclusion. 
 
THE HUNGARIAN PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2011a) during the Hungarian 
Presidency was held on 4 February 2011, discussing four main topics: 1) Energy; 2) 
Innovation; 3) Economic situation; and 4) External relations. The second European Council 
meeting (European Council, 2011b) during the Hungarian Presidency was held on 11 March 
2011, discussing one main topic: 1) Developments in Libya and the southern neighbourhood 
region. The third European Council meeting (European Council, 2011c) during the Hungarian 
Presidency was held on 24/25 March 2011, discussing three main topics: 1) Economic policy; 
2) Libya / southern neighbourhood; and 3) Japan. The comparison of the three first European 
Council meetings with the national interests of Hungary (table 11) reveals that no national 
interests were represented in the conclusions. 
 
The fourth European Council meeting (European Council, 2011d) during the Hungarian 
Presidency was held on 23/24 June 2011, discussing three main topics: 1) Economic policy; 2) 
Migration; and 3) Croatia. The comparison with the national interests of Hungary (table 11) 
reveals that two national interests were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- H3: “endorsed the Presidency’s report on Roma inclusion and called for the rapid 
implementation (…) on the EU framework for Roma integration strategies” (p.13). The 
framework on Roma integration has no overlap (5-NO) with a main topic; 
- H7: “work should accelerate to deliver the Europe 2020 flagship initiatives” (p.3). The 
issue of flagship initiatives has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the conclusion on 
economic policy.  
 
THE POLISH PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2011e) during the Polish Presidency 
was held on 23 October 2011, discussing four main topics: 1) Economic policy; 2) G20; 3) 
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Climate change; and 4) Foreign policy. The comparison with the national interests of Poland 
(table 12) reveals that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- P4: “the pace and depth of these countries’ political and economic integration with 
the EU will depend on (…) the basis of the partnership” (p.11). Economic cooperation 
with countries in the Eastern dimension of the ENP has a minimum overlap (4-MO) 
with the conclusion on foreign policy.  
 
The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2011f) during the Polish Presidency 
was held on 9 December 2011, discussing three main topics: 1) Economic policy; 2) Energy; 
and 3) Enlargement. The comparison with the national interests of Poland (table 12) reveals 
that no national interests were represented in the conclusion. 
 
THE DANISH PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2012a) during the Danish Presidency 
was held on 1/2 March 2012, discussing three main topics: 1) Economic policy; 2) 
International summits; and 3) Foreign policy. The comparison with the national interests of 
Denmark (table 13) reveals that two national interests were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- D5: “calls for agreement to be reached on the Energy Efficiency Directive by June” 
(p.6).  The Energy Efficiency Directive has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the  
extensive conclusion on economic policy; 
- D9: “calls for rapid progress on the low carbon 2050 strategy and on the 
implementation of the roadmap towards a resource-efficient Europe” (p.6). The low 
carbon strategy has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on 
economic policy. 
 
The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2012b) during the Danish 
Presidency was held on 28/29 June 2012, discussing three main topics: 1) Growth, investment 
and jobs; 2) Report on EMU; and 3) Multiannual Financial Framework. The comparison with 
CHAPTER 5 : NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
PAGE 37 
the national interests of Denmark (table 13) reveals that no national interests were 
represented in the conclusion. 
 
THE CYPRIOT PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2012c) during the Cypriot Presidency 
was held on 18/19 October 2012, discussing two main topics: 1) Economic policy; and 2) 
Strategic partners. The comparison with the national interests of Cyprus (table 14) reveals 
that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- C9: “Connecting Europe Facility will constitute an important instrument to promote 
growth through investment in transport, energy and ICT links” (p.3). The CEF has a 
minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on economic policy. 
 
The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2012d) during the Cypriot 
Presidency was held on 13/14 December 2012, discussing one main topic: 1) Economic policy. 
The comparison with the national interests of Cyprus (table 14) reveals that two national 
interests were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- C3: “work on proposals for a Recovery and Resolution Directive and for a Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme Directive should be accelerated” (p.4). The Directives have a 
minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on economic policy; 
- C8: “welcomed the agreement reached (…) on Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Online Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes”. The Resolutions have a minimum 
overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on economic policy. 
 
THE IRISH PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2013a) during the Irish Presidency was 
held on 7/8 February 2013, discussing three main topics: 1) Trade; 2) External relations; and 
3) Multiannual Financial Framework. The comparison with the national interests of Ireland 
(table 15) reveals that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
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- I2: “looks forward to the report of the EU-US High Level Working Group on Jobs and 
Growth and its recommendations” (p.3). The report on the EU-US has a minimum 
overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on Trade. 
 
The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2013b) during the Irish Presidency 
was held on 14/15 March 2013, discussing one main topic: 1) Economic and social policy. The 
comparison with the national interests of Ireland (table 15) reveals that four national interests 
were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- I1: “addressing unemployment is the most important social challenge facing us. Active 
employment, social and labour market policies therefore require special priority and 
attention in the present context and a particular priority must be given to promoting 
youth employment” (p.5). Youth employment has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the 
extensive conclusion on economic and social policy; 
- I7: “look forward to (…) European Research Area progress report” (p.8). The ERA has a 
minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on economic and social policy; 
- I8: “the ongoing negotiations on the European Social Fund Regulation” (p.5). The ESF 
has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on economic and social 
policy; 
- I9: “the rapid conclusion of the work on all Single Market Act 1 proposals is an 
essential priority, particular as regards key files such as (…) posting of workers” (p.6). 
The posting of workers under the Single Market Act has a minimum overlap (4-MO) 
with the extensive conclusion on economic and social policy. 
 
The third European Council meeting (European Council, 2013c) during the Irish Presidency 
was held on 22 May 2013, discussing two main topics: 1) Energy; and 2) Taxation. The 
comparison with the national interests of Ireland (table 15) reveals that no national interests 
were represented in the conclusion. The fourth European Council meeting (European Council, 
2013d) during the Irish Presidency was held on 27/28 June 2013, discussing three main topics: 
1) Youth employment; 2) Growth, competitiveness and jobs; and 3) Completing the Economic 
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and Monetary Union. The comparison with the national interests of Ireland (table 15) reveals 
that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- I8: “exploit all possibilities offered by the European Social Fund” (p.2). The ESF has a 
minimum overlap (4-MO) with the extensive conclusion on youth employment. 
 
THE LITHUANIAN PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2013e) during the Lithuanian 
Presidency was held on 25/25 October 2013, discussing five main topics: 1) Digital economy, 
innovation and services; 2) Economic and social policy; 3) Economic and Monetary Union; 4) 
Eastern partnership; and 5) Migration flows. The comparison with the national interests of 
Lithuania (table 16) reveals that four national interest were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- L1: “rapid implementation by the Member States of the Youth Guarantee and (…) the 
European Alliance for Apprenticeships” (p.9). Youth employment has a significant 
overlap (3-SO) with the conclusion on economic and social policy; 
- L3: “the importance of the Eastern Partnership for building a common area of 
democracy, prosperity and stability across the European continent” (p.17). 
Partnership with the countries in the Eastern Dimension has a significant overlap (3-
SO) with the conclusion on Eastern partnership; 
- L4: “the European Union’s willingness to sign the Association Agreement, including the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, with Ukraine (…). It confirms (…) the 
readiness to initial similar agreements with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia” 
(p.17). FTAs with the countries in the Eastern Dimension have a significant overlap (3-
SO) with the conclusion on Eastern partnership; 
- L5: “the fight against youth employment remains a key objective of the EU strategy to 
foster growth, competitiveness and jobs” (p.9). Youth employment is has a significant 
overlap (3-SO) with the conclusion on economic and social policy. 
 
The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2013f) during the Lithuanian 
Presidency was held on 19/20 December 2013, discussing six main topics: 1) Common 
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security and defence policy; 2) Economic and social policy; 3) Economic and Monetary Union; 
4) Migration flows; 5) Enlargement and the stabilisation and association process; and 6) 
External relations. The comparison with the national interests of Lithuania (table 16) reveals 
that four national interest were represented in the conclusion: 
 
- L1: “particularly youth unemployment including through the full implementation of 
the youth guarantee” (p.12). Youth employment has a minimum overlap (4-MO) with 
the conclusion on economic and social policy; 
- L4: “welcomes the initialling by Georgia and the Republic of Moldova of the 
Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas. (…) 
with Ukraine, as soon as Ukraine is ready” (p.24). FTAs with the countries in the 
Eastern Dimension have a complete overlap (1-CO) with the conclusion on Eastern 
partnership; 
- L5: “the fight against youth employment remains a key objective of the EU strategy to 
foster growth, competitiveness and jobs” (p.13). Youth has a minimum overlap (4-MO) 
with the conclusion on economic and social policy; 
- L6: “the internal energy market. (…) emphasises the need for rapid actions 
implementing the guidelines” (p.25). The internal energy market has no overlap (5-
NO) with a main topic. 
 
THE GREEK PRESIDENCY 
 
The first European Council meeting (European Council, 2014a) during the Greek Presidency 
was held on 20/21 March 2014, discussing two main topics: 1) The European semester; and 2) 
External relations. The comparison with the national interests of Greece (table 17) reveals 
that one national interest was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- G4: “the EU’s willingness to further cooperate with its African partners in promoting 
trade and development, democracy and good governance, the rule of law and human 
rights” (p.15). Assisting Africa is has a significant overlap (3-SO) with the conclusion on 
external relations. 
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The second European Council meeting (European Council, 2014b) during the Greek 
Presidency was held on 26/27 June 2014, discussing three main topics: 1) Freedom, security 
and justice; 2) Growth, competitiveness and jobs; and 3) The next institutional cycle. The 
comparison with the national interests of Greece (table 17) reveals that one national interest 
was represented in the conclusion: 
 
- G1: “endorsed by the European Council. European Union Maritime Security Strategy” 
(p.21). Security in maritime policies has no overlap (5-NO) with a main topic. 
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EXTENT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
 
The analyses of the 23 European Council meetings have allowed the represented national 
interests to be measured to the extent they are represented. There were a total of 30 
national interests represented in the European Council conclusions, which is 35% of the total 
of national interests extracted from the PPPs. Table 19 provides an overview of the number of 
represented national interests per category as outlined in the measuring scale in chapter 3. 
 
Category Number % of national interests discussed 
in European Council (30) 
% of total national interests 
derived from the PPPs (85) 
1-CO (Complete Overlap) 1 3% 1% 
2-NCO (Nearly Complete Overlap) 2 7% 2% 
3-SO (Significant Overlap) 6 20% 7% 
4-MO (Minimum Overlap) 17 57% 20% 
5-NO (No Overlap) 4 13% 5% 
Table 19 - The extent of national interests represented in the European Council 
 
The results of the weighed scores of the represented national interests is 3,7. This means that 
taking all the represented national interests into account, on average the national interests of 
the PPPs have a significant overlap with a main topic of a European Council conclusion. This 
means that most national interests are a key-issue, but not necessarily the only key issue. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 : NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
PAGE 43 
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
 Trio Presidency   Trio Presidency   Trio Presidency 
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S1           P1        I1  X       
S2 X          P2        I2 X        
S3  X         P3        I3         
S4           P4 X       I4         
S5           P5        I5         
S6 X X         P6        I6         
S7           P7        I7  X       
S8           P8        I8  X  X     
S9           P9        I9  X       
S10           P10        I10         
S11           D1        I11         
S12 X          D2        L1     X X   
B1           D3        L2         
B2           D4        L3     X    
B3           D5   X     L4     X X   
B4           D6        L5     X X   
B5           D7        L6      X   
B6           D8        L7         
B7    X       D9   X     G1        X 
B8           C1        G2         
B9           C2        G3         
B10           C3      X  G4       X  
H1           C4        G5         
H2           C5        G6         
H3         X  C6        G7         
H4           C7        G8         
H5           C8      X  G9         
H6           C9     X            
H7         X  C10                 
Table 20 – National interests discussed in the European Council 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The goal of this chapter was to answer the second sub-question: to what extent do European 
Council meetings reflect the national interests of the Member State that holds the rotating 
presidency in the Council of Ministers? Some key conclusions that arise from the analyses are 
stated below.  
 
Firstly, when comparing the European Council conclusions with the national interests derived 
from the PPPs, the analyses show that every presidency has had at least one national interest 
represented in the European Council conclusions. For some presidencies this rose to as many 
as five national interests, while others only had one or two represented. On the other hand, 
only 35% of the 85 national interests derived from the PPPs were actually represented in the 
European Council conclusions during the respective periods. 
 
Secondly, of the 30 national interests that were represented in the European Council 
conclusions, we see that only one national interest (L6 of Lithuania) was in complete overlap 
with what was published in the European Council conclusions. Furthermore, two national 
interests had a nearly complete overlap with what was published in the European Council 
conclusions. From these results it can be concluded that it is rare to see a national interests 
from a PPP being represented in an identical way in the European Council conclusions. The 
middle-ground of the measuring scale, the category of significant overlap, was a result with six 
of the national interests. This meant that even though the national interest was of significance 
for the European Council, it was not the only significant issue under an overarching topic. In 
conclusion, the three categories of national interests that are arguably the most significant for 
the European Council (1-CO, 2-NCO and 3-SO) make up for a total of 9 out of 30 (30%) of the 
represented national interests. When comparing this with all national interests derived from 
the PPPs, these 3 categories represent 11% of all national interests.   
 
Thirdly, the main category of national interests that were represented in the European Council 
was the so-called minimum overlap category (4-MO). This category consisted out of 17 of the 
30 (57%) represented national interests in the European Council. This means that the main 
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group of national interests has only to a small extent overlap with what is published in the 
European Council conclusions. Because of the minimum overlap with the European Council 
conclusions, it can be argued that these interests were not very significant for the European 
Council. On the other hand, the represented interest was part of a larger overarching topic, and 
therefore it cannot be stated that these interests are not of any significance to the European 
Council, but one can clearly see the difference with the three categories represented in the 
previous paragraph. Out of the total of national interests derived from the PPPs, this category 
represents 20%. 
 
Fourthly, 4 national interests out of the 30 (13%) had no overlap with any of the main 
categories of a European Council meeting. These national interests were placed under ‘other 
issues’ and seem therefore to be of the least significance for the European Council. It might 
therefore be rather remarkable that these issues were represented at all,  particularly with 
interest calculation in mind. This might suggest that a presidency was successful in getting a 
national interest represented in the European Council even though it is of little significance for 
the European Council. This category counts for 5% of all national interests extracted from the 
PPPs. 
 
In conclusion, with the help of the above-mentioned categories it can be argued that overall, 
looking at the total of national interests, they are actually represented to a low extent in the 
European Council meetings. Numbers can further support this claim: only 30 out of 85 national 
interests (35%) were discussed during the 23 European Council meetings. Also, only 27% (17 
out of 63) of the main topics of the European Council meetings contained national interests. 
Nevertheless, when looking at the extent of similarity of represented national interests with 
the PPPs, the extracted national interests have on average a significant overlap with a main 
topic in the European Council conclusions. The next chapter is the overall conclusion of this 
thesis and will answer the research question: to what extent are national interests of Member 
States presiding over the Council of the European Union discussed during European Council 
meetings? 
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6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The previous chapter examined to what extent national interests are represented in the 
European Council meetings. This chapter will conclude this thesis through a further analysis of 
the findings of the previous chapters, situating these findings within the debate on the change 
of presidency systems and the representation of national interests under the different 
presidency systems, by identifying gaps warranting further research on this subject and 
answering the research question of this thesis: to what extent are national interests of Member 
States presiding over the Council of the European Union discussed during European Council 
meetings? 
 
With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty the office of a permanent president of the European 
Council was installed, leading to a separation of presidency systems. As studies have shown, 
before the Lisbon Treaty Member States that held the EU presidency were effective in pushing 
national interests forward in the Council of Ministers and European Council. The analysis of 
nine presidencies after the Lisbon Treaty has demonstrated, based on the PPPs, that 
presidency holding Member States certainly still have the intention to pursue national interests 
in the Council of Ministers. However, this research did not focus on the actual discussions in 
the Council of Ministers. Therefore, to examine whether national interests are still being 
pushed in the Council of Ministers, further research is warranted. The national interests of the 
nine presidencies could serve as a basis for a comparison with the outcomes of the Council of 
Minister meetings, in order to prove whether the status quo is maintained, or if there has been 
an increase or decrease in national interests discussed in the meetings. Such research would 
certainly fit in the wider debate on institutional changes created by the Lisbon Treaty. 
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Although the pre-Lisbon EU presidency system seems to be quite similar to the current rotating 
presidency system, this does not apply to the permanent president in the European Council. 
The Lisbon Treaty clearly states the duties of the permanent president, among others that he 
“shall chair and drive forward its work”. This is particularly interesting when taking the 
statement of Odell (2005) into account that chairing an international organisation gives the 
chair power to control and influence the outcome of meetings. As Herman van Rompuy clearly 
established authority during his first term as permanent president, it is arguably a sensible 
assumption that he was leading the European Council meetings after Lisbon. However, this 
demonstrates the main difference with the EU presidency, the Member State that has the 
rotating presidency does no longer chair, and thus control and influence, European Council 
meetings. This demonstration is in line with the theory of normative institutionalism which 
assumes that the rotating presidency has accepted its new role, no longer pushing national 
interests in the European Council. Subsequently, this thesis worked with the following 
hypothesis: Due to the change of presidency systems and the logic of normative 
institutionalism, national interests of the rotating presidencies are not to any extent represented 
in the European Council. The results of the analyses of the European Council meetings have 
proven this hypothesis to be incorrect: national interests of the rotating presidencies have 
been represented in the European Council.  
 
Nevertheless, an important nuance was brought forward in the constructivist approach of 
national interests: “It is (…) important to clarify that there is never a complete separation 
between the domestic and the international when dealing with national interests” (Buchan, 
2012, p5). Looking at the results of the analyses, it has become clear that the national interests 
mentioned in the European Council are to various extents also in the interest of the EU. This is 
arguably a logical statement; why would the European Council discuss issues which are not in 
the interest of the EU? However, by identifying the extent to which the interests were 
represented has given valuable insights: only a few national interests really matched to what 
was published in the European Council conclusions, as the majority of interests only had a 
minimum overlap. Also, a few issues seemed to be least in the interests of the European 
Council, but were a national interest and subsequently represented, which could mean that 
presidencies are in fact successful in getting their interests discussed. On the other hand, it 
became clear that national interests that were represented in the European Council 
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conclusions, have on average, a significant overlap with the national interests extracted from 
the PPPs. However, this claim warrants further research. As the analyses of the documents led 
to this claim, discovering the rationale behind these interests in the European Council, seems 
to be key to give a conclusive value judgement.  
 
Based on the analyses it can be concluded that national interests have been discussed in the 
European Council. Looking at the research question of this thesis: to what extent are national 
interests of Member States presiding over the Council of the European Union discussed during 
European Council meetings? the result of this thesis is that national interests have only been 
discussed to a low extent. This can be based on the figures, but also on the fact that the more a 
national interest was comparable to an issue in the European Council, the fewer times such 
issues were seen in European Council conclusions. 
 
It must be kept in mind however that this research is carried out in the period 2010-2014. It 
can be argued that so soon after the changes of the Lisbon Treaty, rotating presidencies had to 
craft their role in relation to the European Council. Thus, this could mean that later 
presidencies are more successful in having national interests discussed in the European 
Council, or that they follow more the logic of normative institutionalism. Due to this timeframe, 
further research on later presidencies is warranted. Arguably this should be done in a period 
when a different permanent president is installed, as this could also influence the outcome. 
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